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COMMENTS
THE 1981 AFDC AMENDMENTS: RHETORIC
AND REALITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Undoubtedly, the year 1981 will come to be known as this nation's
year of coping. The year's political dialogue revolved around our
problems of unemployment, high interest rates, and inflation; the
budget cuts and tax benefits enacted were seen as solutions. That
much will be remembered of 1981. But what of the millions of slumdwelling Americans who will receive no tax benefits because they do
not earn enough to file a return? What of the millions who are little
troubled by high interest rates because they could not obtain a loan
under any circumstances? What of the millions so wracked by illness,
cold-age, or handicaps that work is impossible and for whom unemploy;ment rates mean nothing? These millions have received little popular
attention. And yet, 1981 was also a year of drastic changes in the
federal support programs which aid these very persons." In fact, of the
eleven billion dollars of 1981 "Reaganomics" cuts in entitlement programs, fully sixty per cent represented cuts in programs that aid the
poor.' For those with so little, changes so sweeping mean much; the
statutes come to determine the poor's very ability to survive.
This comment will examine the most controversial of the 1981
welfare law amendments:3 the changes in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC).' Explored will be a number of the
employment-related AFDC amendments.s In large part, this comment
will evaluate these amendments from the perspective of what they assume about the recipients they so vitally affect. In poverty law, this is
a singularly necessary perspective because welfare recipients rarely

-1. Changes to the social welfare system were enacted in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981).
2. Reagan's Polarized America, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 5, 1982, at 17.
3. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 2301-21, 95 Stat.
357, 843-60 (1981) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 602-03, 606-07, 609, 612).
For final regulations implementing these changes, see 47 Fed. Reg. 5648-86 (1982) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 205-06, 232-35, 238-39).
4. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, §§ 401-06, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29 (1935)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-76 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
5. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 2301, 2307, 95 Stat.
357, 843-44, 846-48 (1981) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(8)(A), 609).
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lobby Congress or publicize their needs. Even more rarely do they
lobby to have their benefits cut. As one author explained it, the poor
"do not, by far and large, belong to unions, to fraternal organizations,
or to political parties. They are without lobbies of their own; they put
forward no legislative program. As a group, they are atomized. They
have no face; they have no voice." 6 As a result, America's welfare law
has for some time been dictated by non-poor persons' notions of what it
is like to be poor. In this political context, welfare programs can be
judged effective only to the extent that the policy-makers who author
them act upon realistic assumptions of who is actually "on the dole."
As will be noted later, unrealistic and biased assumptions often intrude
into the making of welfare policy-to the obvious detriment of the
recipients.
II.

AFDC:

THE PROGRAM

Today, persons using the epithet "welfare" are most likely referring to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. AFDC
has become this nation's most important and conspicuous income support program.7 The scheme that was to become known as "AFDC" was
enacted during the Great Depression in response to especially persistent

Congressional lobbying.8 Programs of support for needy youth and
their families, however, had been urged upon Congress long before the
thirties. About the turn of the century, social welfare organizations began to express concern about the disastrous effects of poverty upon
American family life.' The years just before the turn of the century

saw the migration of millions of rural-dwelling Americans into the
newly industrialized cities.' 0 Unfortunately, this urban growth occurred

at a frantic and unhealthy pace; many metropolitan areas were nothing
more than "human pigsties."" The urban America of that day fur-

6. M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1963).
7. The program has become conspicuous because of its size; 6.9 billion federal dollars will
be spent on it in fiscal year 1983. See 1983 Budget, S. Con. Res. 92, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128
CONG. REC. H3722-33 (daily ed. June 22, 1982); Northeast-Midwest Congressional Coalition,
First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal 1983 5 (1982).
8. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, §§ 401-06, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29 (1935)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-76 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
Were it not for the persuasive lobbying of two women-Katherine Lenroot and Martha Eliot-the New Deal would have been without any aid for needy children. These two welfare professionals convinced a very reluctant House committee of the need for such a program See Goodman, Welfare Policy and its Consequences for the Recipient Population: A Study of the AFDC
Program, United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 2-3 (1969); E. WITTE,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 162-63 (1962).
9. W. BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 3-5 (1965).
10. T. BAILEY, THE AMERICAN PAGEANT: A HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC 547 (1956).
11. Id.
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nished families who had fallen upon hard luck with practically no government aid and only occasional niggardly charitable donations." If a
breadwinner became disabled and could no longer support his or her
family, a common solution was to institutionalize or indenture the children so that the other parent could find a job.' s If the father deserted
the family, the same procedure was used: the wife effectively lost her
children. Some lamented this decline in American family life, most notably at the First White House Conference on Children in 1909. The
Conference concluded that "[h]ome life is the highest and finest product of civilization. It is the great molding force of mind and character. . . Except in unusual circumstances, the home should not be broken up for reasons of poverty.""
Decades later, the Great Depression only aggravated the problem
of 'fragmenting family life. It had become painfully clear by this time
that neither local governments nor private charities were able to furnigh any real aid to the quickly increasing numbers of impoverished
children.' 8 In response, a federal program of aid, later to become
known as "AFDC," was enacted "[flor the purpose of encouraging the
"...
16 Later, aid
,care of dependent children in their own homes .
payments under the program were extended to the parents of needy
,children as well.' 7 Today, aid comes to dependent children and those
caring for them in the form of federally subsidized grants-in-aid.18 The

During the Civil War, no American city had a population of one million. In 1890, New York,
Chicago, and Philadelphia each had over one million inhabitants. Ten years later, in 1900, New
York's population had tripled. With 3.5 million residents, New York had become the world's
second largest city. Id.
12. BELL, supra note 9, at 3-4.
.13. Id.
14. S. Doc. No. 721, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1909).
'15. L. KOMISAR, DOWN AND OUT IN THE USA 43-44 (1973); Goodman, supra note 8, at 2.
Moreover, child labor-a "solution" to the problem of child poverty for centuries past-had
by this time been virtually eliminated. See W. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE
98-99 (1974). Children acting as wage earners for their destitute families became far less common
after the passage of such child labor statutes as the Owen-Keating Act, Pub. L. No. 64-249, 39
Stat. 675, 675-76 (1916).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976). For definitions of who is a "dependent child" for purposes
of theact, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 606(a), 607(a), 608(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Annot., 23 A.L.R.
FED. 232 (1975).
17. Social Security Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 880, § 312, 70 Stat. 807, 848-49
(1956) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976)).
18. The federal government provides amounts proportionately matching the amounts expended by state and local governments on AFDC. In 1982, the federal government contributed
54% of the amounts expended on AFDC, the states 40%, and localities six percent. See Library of
Congress, Congressional Research Service, Welfare Reform 4 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Library
of Congress].
The complex arithmetic which determines the federal contribution to state AFDC programs
is set out at 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1976 &-Supp. IV 1980).
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federal government provides matching funds to those states choosing to
participate in AFDC so long as these states meet certain minimum federal standards.1 Program implementation and setting of grant levels
are left to the states.'0 Since its inception, the program has seen great
growth both in the number of recipients' and in the level of federal
participation." In 1981, over 11.1 million individuals received AFDC
payments which totalled approximately 1.1 billion dollars per month in
federal and state spending.'

19.

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1976 & Supp. IV-1980); 45-C.F.R. § 233.90 (1980).

20. In the AFDC program, no federally-imposed regulations dictate how much or how little
the states may choose to spend on dependent children. The program is, as a result, characterized
by gross disparities among the states in benefits offered. For instance, Mississippi allocates maximum monthly benefits of $96 to a family of three persons with no other income. Alaska grants
$571 in monthly benefits to this same-sized family. See Library of Congress, supra note 18, at 4;
Chief, Need Determination in AFDC Program, Soc. SECURITY BULL., Sept. 1979, at 11-21.
Moreover, benefit levels have suffered over the years in many states. According to government statistics, AFDC recipients today receive 24% less in benefits, adjusted for inflation, than
they did in 1969. Cited in Kotz, The War on the Poor, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 24, 1982, at
18, 19. Cf Emsellem, Assessing AFDC Standards of Need, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 122, 127-28
(1982).
This lack of federally-established minimum benefit levels makes AFDC somewhat unique;
federal programs of aid to the elderly, the blind, and the disabled all have federally-imposed
minimum grants applicable to the states. Over the years, Congress has been criticized for failing
to impose similar minimum standards for AFDC recipients. See. e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1972,
at 44, col. I.
21. Except for brief periods, growth in the number of AFDC recipients has been continually
upward since the program began. At times, this rise has been dramatic. The number of recipients
being aided by the program nearly tripled in the period 1965-1972, from 4.4 million recipients in
1965 to over I I million recipients in 1972. See A. KADUSHIN, CHILD WELFARE SERVICES 164 (2d
ed. 1974).
These increases are probably related to the growing liberalization of eligibility requirements
and the availability of higher benefits. Moreover, the War on Poverty-if it did nothing
else--certainly succeeded in making the poor aware of the availability of welfare benefits. Id. at
164-67.
22. The federal government's role in AFDC was greatly expanded during the 1960's War
on Poverty. During this period, policy-makers' notions of the goals welfare payments were to serve
changed markedly. As President Kennedy put it, AFDC was to become a means of "stressing
services in addition to support, rehabilitation instead of relief, and training for useful work instead
of prolonged dependency ....
" See id. at 160. AFDC monies for the first time came to be used
for the rehabilitation of parents as well as in various work incentive projects. The result was an
enhanced federal role in AFDC, overseeing and developing these new projects. Id.
23. Duvall, Goudreau, & Marsh, Aid to Families with Dependent Children: Characteristics
of Recipients in 1979, Soc. SECURITY BULL., Apr. 1982, at 3. [hereinafter cited as
Characteristics].
See also supra note 21.
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III. AFDC:

THE

1981

A.

The Earned Income Disregard

1.

The Provisions

AMENDMENTS

Since 1935, calculation of an AFDC recipient's level of benefits
has involved several distinct steps. First, each participating state must
establish its own "need standard. 2 4 The need standard is that amount
which a state believes necessary to provide for the essential needs of a
family of a certain size.'1 Assuming that a family's income falls below
this amount, the members may be eligible for AFDC benefits. Determining how much these benefits will be (for a recipient with resources
of less than the need standard) involves a second step: calculating the
difference between the recipient's resources and the need standard.
This difference is known as the "budget deficit." The recipient receives
a benefit check representing some percentage of his budget deficit. In
other words, an AFDC check is some percentage of the amount by
which the recipient's resources fail to reach the standard of need.?
This method of calculating benefits came under growing criticism
in the 1960's. The difficulty was that the above procedure caused significant reductions in AFDC benefits for recipients once they became
employed. When an AFDC recipient went to work, his salary had to be
counted as an additional resource.27 Therefore, the recipient's budget
deficit-the balance between his resources and the need standard-was
reduced by an amount equal to wages earned. Put simply, an AFDC
recipient taking a job saw his benefit check from the government reduced dollar-for-dollar by the amount of his wages. In the mid 1960's,
Congress became convinced that such methods of calculation were discouraging recipients from seeking employment; changes were therefore
thought necessary."

24. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2) (1980).
25. Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 253 (1974). The different state legislatures have
adopted widely varying need standards. See supra note 20.
26. States are not required to provide benefits to recipients that equal these recipients'
budget deficits. They may impose limits on the amounts that recipients can receive-whether the
recipient is brought up to the need standard thereby or not. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 483 (1970).
In fact, a majority of states provide AFDC recipients with benefits that equal amounts less
than these recipients' budget deficits. See Chief, supra note 20, at 17.
27. By statute, states were required to. "indetermining need, take into consideration any
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)
other income and resources of any child or relative claiming aid .....
(1976) (emphasis added).
28. S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2834, 2994-95.
See also X v. McCorkle, 333 F. Supp. 1109, 1115 (D.N.J. 1970), modified sub nom. Engelman v. Amos, 404 U.S. 23 (1971).
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The solution to this dilemma was known as the "earned income
disregard," which was added to the program with a number of other
progressive changes in 1968.1" With this new feature, the recipient who
decided to take a job would now be permitted to keep the first thirty
dollars of his earned income-an amount which would have previously
been deducted out of his AFDC benefit check. 0 In addition, the recipient was allowed to retain one-third of any additional sums of income
earned.31
2.

The Amendment

The 1981 amendments largely do away with the earned income
disregard.32 Under current law, recipients will gain the benefit of these
disregards for only a four-month period-after which their AFDC
checks will be reduced dollar-for-dollar by the amount of their wages.33
Congress took this action under the assumption that the disregard pro-

29. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 202(b), 81 Stat. 881-82
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8) (1976)).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8) (1976) (states must disregard from a recipient's earned income,
in benefit calculations, "the first $30 of the total of such earned income for such month plus onethird of the remainder of such income .... 9). See infra note 33 for an example of the operation
of the disregard.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8) (1976).
32. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2301, 95 Stat. 843,
843-44 (1981) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)).
33. Id. ("in the case of the earned income of a person with respect to whom [the earned
income disregard] has been applied for four consecutive months, [the state] shall not apply the
provisions of [the earned income disregard] for so long as he continues to receive aid under the
plan. ... ).
An example of the operation of the earned income disregard: Recipient lives in a state with a
need standard of $300 per month. For a period of time, she has no resources or income at all and
a resulting budget deficit (that is, need standard minus resources) of $300. The state pays her this
$300 amount every month.
Finally, she finds employment which pays a monthly salary of $200. Under the pre-1968
AFDC statutes, the state must count these new wages as "resources" and thereby reduce her
budget deficit by her wage amount. Her new budget deficit will be only $100 (that is, $300 minus
$200), and this would represent the amount of her monthly AFDC check.
After 1968, the earned income disregard would permit her to keep a portion of her wages as
an incentive to continued employment. Specifically, she would not have to declare the first $30 of
her income as well as one-third of the remainder of this income as a resource. That is, she is
credited with the first $30 of her monthly $200 salary, plus one-third of the remaining $170. She
is therefore credited with a total of $87 per month ($30 plus $57). This $87 amount is "disregarded" when her resources are calculated: she has resources therefore of only $113 instead of her
$200 wage amount. This adjusted figure of $113 is subtracted from the state's standard of need
($300) to give her a budget deficit of $187-the amount of her AFDC check.
Under the 1981 amendments, this recipient will be benefited by the earned income disregard
for only four months, after which the full amount of her wages will be deemed a resource. In
other words, for four months she will receive a benefit check of $187 which will drop to $100 in
the fifth and succeeding months. If she remains employed, her AFDC check will be reduced from
the fifth month on dollar-for-dollar by the amount of any wages she is able to earn.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol8/iss1/4

1982]

COMMENTS

visions were not succeeding in encouraging employment to any great
degree. 4
3.

The Amendment's Consequences

a.

Background

Congress, in virtually eliminating the earned income disregard, acted contrary to welfare law's conventional wisdom.3 ' For some time, it
has been assumed that one of the few effective ways of inducing welfare recipients to find employment was to permit them to retain some
portion of their earned income. The alternative, reducing a recipient's
benefits dollar-for-dollar by the amount of his wages-in effect a one
hundred per cent tax on earnings-has been thought an unwise and
counterproductive strategy. The earned income disregard has been

34. See Administration's Proposed Savings in Unemployment Compensation, Public Assistance,. and Social Services Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Public Assistance and
Unemployment Compensation of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 11
"(1981) (statement of Richard Schweiker, Secretary, United States Department of Health and
Human Services) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] ("One of the most significant problems in
AFDC is the fact that individuals, once on the rolls, tend to stay on the rolls indefinitely even
though working at high income levels. This is because the $30 and one-third work incentive applies -indefinitely ....
").
See also S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 502, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD.'NEws 767, 769.
The Congress thought it significant that "[o]nly about 8 percent of AFDC case closings are
due to the earnings of the mother." Id. This is a somewhat superficial analysis. A statistic such as
this seems to reinforce the myth that the average AFDC recipient languishes on the rolls for long
periods of time. In fact, this is not at all true. Viewed honestly, welfare is no haven for the lazy
today. "Welfare at present seems to serve primarily as a way society copes with two of its
problems, family disruption and labor market inadequacy." See Rein & Rainwater, Patterns of
Welfare Use, 52 Soc. SERV. REV. 511, 532 (1978). That is, the typical AFDC mother is eligible
for aid because her family has lost her husband's earning power. See KADUSHIN, supra note 21,
at 168, 183. Moreover, the average AFDC mother will not linger on the dole indefinitely. Only a
fraction of AFDC mothers remain dependent on the aid for long; most leave the rolls quickly after
their-moment of need has passed. See id. at 183. Of the minority who must remain on AFDC for
long periods, most able to work will work at wages too low to support their families were it not for
the AFDC supplement. See AuClaire, The Mix of Work and Welfare among Long-Term AFDC
Recipients, 53 Soc. SERv. REV. 586, 594, 603 (1979); Rein & Rainwater, supra at 520-33. See
also infra notes 61, 146-53.
The AFDC rolls, then, are properly characterized by a quick turnover of recipients as well as
a high amount of work effort by many who remain on the rolls. Therefore, a statistic like "[olnly
about 8 percent of AFDC case closings are due to the earnings of the mother" means little. Such
a statistic ignores those mothers-and there are many-who work at low-paying jobs and still
require the monthly AFDC check for survival. As one commentator noted, "static, one-shot measurement of employment rates among welfare recipients tends significantly to understate the extent of actual labor force attachment." See Bell & Bushe, Neglecting the Many, Helping the
Few: The Impact of the 1967 AFDC Work Incentives, Center for Studies in Income Maintenance Policy (1975), cited in AuClaire, supra at 603.
35. See infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
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termed an effective policy for spurring employment by economists",
and welfare professionals alike."7 Moreover, positive results in the form
of increased numbers of employed AFDC recipients have been documented to follow from the practice of lowering the "tax" on recipients'
3
earnings.
In fact, the last decade has seen a great many proposals to permit
AFDC recipients to retain even more of their earnings.39 Many commentators feel that allowing recipients to retain from their salary thirty
dollars and one-third of the balance-in effect a 662/% tax on earnings-is simply too meager an incentive to be truly effective. 0 Consequently, conservative thinkers like Richard Nixon" and liberal economists like James Tobin 42 have expressed agreement as to the need to
raise and not lower the earned income disregard. Ironically enough,
Budget Director David Stockman advocated just such a course some
years ago.43
36. Milton Friedman has urged that welfare recipients should be permitted to retain even
more of their earnings than was permitted under past law as an incentive to employment. Cited in
M. ANDERSON, WELFARE 139 (1978). See also Garfinkel & Orr, Welfare Policy and the Employment Rate of AFDC Mothers, 27 NAT'L TAX J. 275, 282 (1974) (analysis which indicates that
permitting AFDC recipients to retain ten percent more of their earnings will translate into a seven
percent increase in the employment rate of these recipients).
37. See Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Impact on Welfare
Families of the Reagan Administration's Proposed Treatment of Earnings (Selected Cities) 19
(1981); Work Expense Proposals and Income Disregards in Aid to Families with Dependent
Children Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Public Assistance of the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57-58 (1976) (statement of G. Thomas Riti, Director,
Division of Public Welfare, New Jersey Department of Institutions and Agencies) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings]; Joe, Profiles of Families in Poverty: Effects of the FY 1983 Budget Proposals
on the Poor, Center for the Study of Social Policy 17 (1982).
. 38. S. LEVITAN, M. REIN & D. MARWICK, WORK AND WELFARE Go TOGETHER 66 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as WORK AND WELFARE]; M. SANGER, WELFARE OF THE POOR 45 (1979);
Garfinkel & Orr, supra note 36, at 282; Appel, Effects of a Financial Incentive on AFDC Employment: Michigan's Experience Between July 1969 and July 1970 79 (1972); Garflinkel &
Masters, Estimating the Labor Supply Effects of Income Maintenance Alternatives 169 (1977);
Hausman, The Impact of Welfare on the Work Effort of AFDC Mothers 94 (1970); Smith, Welfare Work Incentives: The Earnings Exemption and Its Impact Upon AFDC Employment, Earnings and Program Cost, Michigan Department of Social Services 219 (1974); Williams, Public
Assistance and Work Effort: The Labor Supply of Low-Income Female Heads of Household I II
(1975).
39. See, e.g., S. 2777, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 103, 124 CONG. REC. S4307, S4317 (daily ed.
Mar. 22, 1978).
40. See F. WEYMAR, SOCIAL POLICIES FOR AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES: NINE DIVERGENT
VIEWS 55 (R. Theobald ed. 1969); Graham, Public Assistance: Congress and The Employable
Mother, 3 U. RICH. L. REV. 223, 255 (1969); Zall & Betheil, The WIN Program: Implications
for Welfare Reform and Jobs Organizing, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 272, 279 (1979); Joe, supra
note 37, at 17.
41.

THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT THEY ARE-WHAT THEY SHOULD BE

sen ed. 1971).
42. See WORK AND WELFARE, supra note 38, at 115.
43. Center for Social Welfare Policy and Law, press release (1982).
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There have, however, been critics of the entire notion of welfare
program disregards. Many criticize the potential for abuse by recipients who intentionally earn only enough to stay on the rolls and remain
eligible for AFDC and the disregards." Still others point to the small
numbers of AFDC recipients who have been able to "work themselves
off" the welfare rolls as evidence of the failure of the earned income
disregard. 4 5 Some, taking a behavioralist view, assert the difficulty of
bribing recipients off AFDC and into paying jobs. ' During the 1981
rounds of budget cutting, however, it was the economic argument
against disregards that most swayed Congress to make the changes it
did.4 That is, by reducing recipients' benefit levels dollar-for-dollar by
the amount of their wages, Congress expected to save $374 million in
fiscal year 1982."
b. Fiscal Consequences
By most reliable estimates, Congress' hopes of saving money with

changed since joining the Administration.
3! just don't accept the assumption that the federal government has a responsibility to sup,plement the income of the working poor through a whole series of transfer payments. We
'believe that the guy who takes two jobs and makes $26,000 a year shouldn't be obligated to
transfer part of his income and taxes to the guy who's making $10,000.
See'The Heritage Foundation, Workfare: Breaking the Poverty Cycle 1 (1982).
44. See supra note 34. See also Hearings. supra note 37, at 28 (statement of Keith Comrie,
Director, Los Angeles County Department of Social Services).
-45. Of those AFDC mothers able to leave the welfare rolls, only 8% are able to do so
because of earnings from voluntary employment. See S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 502,
reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 767, 769. But see supra note 34.
Not at all surprisingly, one of the flaws of the past system of disregards that may have prevented them from having enough incentive effect might have been lack of knowledge on the part
of welfare recipients as to how the complex disregard was being calculated, or that it was being
calculated at all. See Hearings. supra note 37, at 37 (statement of Hyman Frankel, General
Counsel, New York City Human Resources Administration); Opton, Factors Associated with Employment Among Welfare Mothers, Wright Inst. 1 (1971); Solarz, Effects of the Earnings Exemption Provision on AFDC Recipients, WELFARE IN REV., Jan.-Feb. 1971, at 18-20.
46. It has, for instance, been suggested that the increasing availability of welfare benefits in
addition to AFDC-Medicaid and food stamps, for example-decrease the effectiveness of any
system of disregards. That is, recipients may be less likely to attempt to become independent of
AFDC if this independence means they lose medical care and food stamps as well as AFDC
benefits. See Rein, Work in Welfare: Past Failures and Future Strategies, 56 Soc. SERV. REV.
211, 215 (1982). See also WORK AND WELFARE, supra note 38, at 45.
Other commentators stress that people are motivated to take jobs for many other reasons
besides economic inducement. Richard Nathan of Princeton asserts that people often take employment simply because they enjoy it. See Schorr, Will Reagan's Welfare Plan Work?, Wall St. J.,
June 24, 1981, at 30, col. 5.
47. For an economic argument against spending great sums on disregards, see generally
Dorsen,.supra note 41, at 89.
48. S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 503, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 767. 769.
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this amendment were a pipe dream. " ' The changes may indeed have
quite the opposite effect and cost the government dearly.50 Only months
after the Congressional Budget Office predicted that the limiting of the
earned income disregards would result in federal savings of $374 million, it issued revised estimates of the amendments' effects. Further
analysis had led the Congressional Budget Office to downgrade the savings predicted by nearly $240 million.5 1 New computer models had
confirmed the worst fears of the amendments' opponents:" tens of
thousands of AFDC recipients would quit their jobs in reaction to the
limiting of the disregard.5 3 And for every mother who quits her job to
become totally dependent on welfare, the federal government need
spend an additional one hundred dollars each month to support her
family." Assuming that the Congressional Budget Office's estimates
are correct, this phenomenon will happen several thousand-fold, as
sixty to seventy thousand AFDC recipients cease employment across
the nation. 55 One state's welfare administration predicts that fully
13,000 of the total 17,000 employed AFDC recipients in that state will
quit their jobs." The state, already reeling from the blows of federal
budget cuts in other sectors, 7 expects to be dealt a shocking thirtyeight million dollar increase in costs to support all of these recipients

49. See infra notes 51, 56-58.
50. Id.
51. The Congressional Budget Office now predicts savings of $137 million from the changes
made to the system of disregards. See Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,
AFDC: FY 82 Budget Cuts 2-4 (1982). Even this figure may be optimistic, however. Some state
welfare officials predict that the amendment will cost rather than save money. See American
Public Welfare Association, Preliminary Report: APWA Survey of the States' Own Estimates of
the Cost and Caseload Effects of the AFDC Changes Made by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 4 (1982).
52. For criticism of the work disincentive aspects of the 1981 amendments, see generally
Joe, supra note 37, at 15-24; Rein, supra note 46, at 227; Schwartz, The AFDC Changes,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 20, 1981, at 26, col. 1; 127 CONG. REC. SI 1991-92 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981)
(statement of Sen. Moynihan).
53. See Joe, supra note 37, at 22; Congressional Budget Office, Effects of Tax and Benefit
Reductions Enacted in 1981 for Households in Different Income Categories 22 (1982).
54. See Joe, supra note 37, at 22.
55. See supra note 53. The impacts will not be merely fiscal. Welfare dependency once
created is not easily undone; dependency behavior spanning generations can be set into motion.
As one commentator cautioned, "[t]he damage done to the incentive structures of the public assistance program under the proposals can take time to undo. Although enacted as minor changes, the
historical development of income maintenance programs provides ample evidence that such
changes can remain in force for years." See Joe, supra note 37, at 28.
56. See Schorr, supra note 46, at 30.
57. Also cut in recent years has been federal aid to day-care centers. Without federal subsidies, the child care that would permit a mother to become employed is often too expensive for an
AFDC mother. See Schorr, Canceled Checks, Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1981. at I, col. 1, 14, col. 2.
See also infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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now entirely dependent on AFDC."
c.

Employment Consequences

The obvious explanation for this employment exodus lies in the
work disincentives written into the 1981 amendments." As the law exists since the amendments, working AFDC recipients will as likely as
not end up with the same or less income than unemployed AFDC recipients.60 In other words, it will simply not pay an AFDC recipient
earning average wages06 to work if he is not able to keep some portion
of them under the earned income disregard." With a one hundred per
cent tax on earnings, parents in at least a dozen states taking home
average wages will earn more by quitting their jobs and becoming entirely dependent on AFDC benefits." In some states, this anomaly is
especially pronounced. Vermont AFDC recipients earning average
wages become fifty-three dollars per month richer by ceasing employment and going on the dole." In states where day-care and babysitting

58. See Schorr, supra note 46, at 30.
'59. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
60. See Joe, supra note 37, at 15-20. Most of the statistics that follow in this section come
from one of the more exhaustive studies to date of the impact of the AFDC amendments, Profiles
of Families in Poverty: Effects of the FY 1983 Budget Proposals on the Poor. Issued by the University of Chicago's Center for the Study of Social Policy, it was authored by Thomas Joe, a
leading expert in the field. Mr. Joe's work in welfare policy spans many years in and out of
government, including service as Special Assistant to the Undersecretary of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare in the Nixon administration.
61. One complicating factor with AFDC recipients is that, because of their handicaps, poor
work experience, etc., they earn at levels considerably below the population in general. See Cox,
The Employment of Mothers as a Means of Family Support, WELFARE IN REV., Nov.-Dec. 1970,
at 9, 14-16. See also AuClaire, supra note 34, at 599; Solarz, supra note 45, at 19.
62. See Joe, supra note 37, at 15-20. For the results of a recent study indicating that welfare law work disincentives may indeed be discouraging many from taking jobs, see N.Y. Times,
May 16, 1982, at 31, col. 1.
63. Id. at 15-16.
64. Id. Many of those who continue to work will be pushed off of the rolls entirely by the
new rules. Unable to deduct a portion of their earned income after the four-month limit, many
families will find their income levels pushed above state eligibility limits. The change in the earned
income disregard as well as other of the 1981 amendments have had this effect on many families
as of this writing. Nationwide, 400,000 cases are conservatively estimated by the Department of
Health and Human Services to lose all benefits as a result of the 1981 changes, with many others
to face large reductions in benefit levels. Letter from Michael deMaar, Acting Director, Office of
Family Assistance, United States Department of Health and Human Services to Michael
Neuhardt (July 23, 1982) (on file at University of Dayton Law Review). That such an estimate is
conservative is suggested by the amendments' effect in Ohio alone. In Ohio, well over 20,000 cases
have been cut from the program since 1981; over 10,000 have faced reductions. Ohio Department
of Public Welfare, Press Release 1-2 (Feb. 18, 1982) (on file at University of Dayton Law
Review).
But there are implications for public welfare other than lowered recipient levels. As the truly
destitute are cut from AFDC-a program jointly sponsored by the states and the federal government-many of these same individuals will seek aid from "general assistance" programs. These
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costs are especially high, the new treatment of child care expenses s as
well as the change in the earned income disregard will effectively prohibit single parents from being able to work."
B.

The Work Expense Disregard

1.

The Provisions

In 1962, AFDC law0 7 began to permit recipients to "disregard"
from earned income all work-related" expenses. These expenses were
not to be counted against the recipient's benefit level." The underlying
policy of the disregard for work expenses was the same as that for the
earned income disregard. It was thought that "if these work expenses
are not considered in determining need, they have the effect of providing a disincentive to working .... "170
2.

The Amendment

In 1974, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the AFDC
work expense provision as forbidding states from adopting
"[s]tandardized treatment of employment-related expenses without
provision for demonstrating actual and reasonable expenses in excess of
that standard amount .... "71 That is, states which limited the

amount of work-related expenses a recipient could disregard violated
congressional intent and the intent of the Social Security Act in provid-

general assistance programs are funded entirely by state and local governments and often provide
recipients with an even more niggardly level of aid than does AFDC. The net effect of reductions
such as those enacted in 1981, then, may largely be a mere shifting of responsibility for the poor
from the federal government to the states-at a time when many states are fiscally unable to
properly aid current levels of general assistance recipients. See generally Lewis, Local General
Assistance Costs and Restrictive Categorical Aid Policies, Soc. WORK, Oct. 1961, at 65, 68;
Letter from David Reines, Cuyahoga County, Ohio Welfare Department to Michael Neuhardt
(June 18, 1982) (on file at University of Dayton Law Review).
65. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
66. See Library of Congress, supra note 37, at 12-13, 17.
67. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 106(b), 76 Stat. 172, 188
(1962) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976)) (states must, "in determining need, take into
consideration . . .any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of such income.").
68. Federal law and regulations are silent as to what constitutes a "work-related" expense.
One state has permitted deductions for "tools, equipment, special uniforms, work shoes, union
" See 127 CONG. REC. S1901 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1981).
dues, medical insurance ....
69. The method for calculating the work expense disregard is much the same as that for the
earned income disregard. See supra note 33 for an explanation.
70. S. REP. No. 1589, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1943, 1959-60.
71. Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1974). See also Connecticut State Dep't of
Pub. Welfare v. Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 448 F.2d 209, 217 (2d Cir. 1971);
Williford v. Laupheimer, 311 F. Supp. 720, 722 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Green v. Obledo, 29 Cal. 3d
126, 131-40, 624 P.2d 256, 258-64, 172 Cal. Rptr. 206, 208-14 (1981).
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ing an incentive to employment.7' The 1981 amendments adopt just
such a treatment of work expenses as was invalidated by the Supreme
Court. Now, AFDC recipients employed full-time will not be able to
deduct work expenses in monthly amounts greater than seventy-five
dollars, nor child-care expenses in monthly amounts greater than onehundred sixty dollars.7
3.

The Amendment's Consequences

a.

Employment Hardships

The major criticism of the AFDC work expense disregard has
been in its alleged abuse by recipients reporting excessive amounts of
expenses.7 4 However, permitting AFDC recipients to disregard only the
small amounts currently allowed is likely to result in only new
problems. First, many AFDC recipients are presently incurring work
and child-care expenses in excess of the amounts they are permitted to
claim under the 1981 amendments. 7 One consequence of this treatment of earnings will doubtless be that "people will have to draw upon
food or rent money to pay for the expense of getting to work." 6 To the
extent that AFDC recipients do not profit sufficiently by their labor,
they are bound to put an end to work expenses by ceasing employment
altogether.7 7 For mothers who continue working, the disparities inherent in the new law will be patent:
An AFDC mother in New York City who has found a job working
across town in a municipal hospital as a nurse's aide on the evening shift
will have to buy uniforms and would wisely take a taxi home in the middle of the night. She may also have to pay to have her children cared for
while she is working. To grant her the same work-related expenses as the
mother who is employed as a babysitter down the block and brings her
78
own children with her would be an absurdity.

72. 416 U.S. at 264-65.
73. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2301, 95 Stat. 357,
843-44 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)).
74. See 127 CONG. REC. S1901-02 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1981) (statement of Sen. Inouye);
Hearings, supra note 37, at 9 (statement of Sylvia Havelin, Assistant Supervisor, Income Maintenance Division, Monroe County, New York Department of Social Services).
75. See Library of Congress, supra note 37, at 6-7,17; Characteristics, supra note 23, at 9;
Zeitlin & Campbell. Availability of Child Care for Low-Income Families, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 285, 303 n.257, 304 n.258 (1982). See also Turner v. Woods, No. C 81-4457 TEH,slip op.
at 19 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 1982).
76. See Hearings, supra note 37, at 46 (statement of Henry Freedman, spokesman, The
Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law).
77. See Schwartz, supra note 52, at 26.
78. See Hearings, supra note 37. at 4 (statement of Bert Seidman, spokesman for the AFLCIO).
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Some Controversy in the Interpretation of the Amendment

One aspect of the new standardized seventy-five dollar work expense disregard has been successfully challenged in the courts as recently as July, 1982.7 These recent court challenges have focused on
whether mandatory payroll deductions (as, for instance, for federal income tax withholding) constitute "work expenses." Since the 1981
amendments, this has become an important issue because recipients
may now be credited for only seventy-five dollars worth of work
expenses.80
Whether mandatory payroll deductions are to be considered work
expenses is unclear from the regulations on point.81 In fact, the applicable regulations are seemingly in conflict .8 s The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services has argued that mandatory payroll deductions are "work expenses" and hence included in the seventyfive dollar amount disregarded from recipients' income. 83 Plaintiffs, on
the other hand, have urged that mandatory payroll deductions are not
"work expenses" and that recipients should be permitted to disregard
both the seventy-five dollar amount as well as mandatory payroll deductions." Put another way, plaintiffs have argued that, in calculating
benefit levels, one begins with a recipient's net take-home pay and proceeds from this amount to subtract out the standardized seventy-five
dollar figure allowed under the 1981 amendments. 8 The jurisdictions
which have considered the issue are split as of this writing: two holding

79. See Turner v. Woods, No. C 81-4457 TEH (N.D. Cal. July 29, 1982) (available on
LEXIS). See also infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
80. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2301, 95 Stat. 357,
843-44 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)).
81. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., RAM v. Blum, 533 F. Supp. 933, 937, 942-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
This argument is premised, inter alia, upon administrative regulations at 45 C.F.R. §
233.20(a)(6)(iv) (1980) which define "earned income" as "the total amount, irrespective of personal expenses, such as income tax deductions .... " According to the Secretary, this regulation
gives meaning to the 1981 amendments' command that work expenses be disregarded from
"earned income." Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2301, 95
Stat. 357, 843 (1981) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(ii)). That is, earned income
includes payroll deductions-which are properly classed as "work expenses"-and it is from this
gross earned income figure that the new $75 deduction is taken. When a recipient's work expenses
are deducted out of his gross income, he faces an obvious disadvantage when the balance thus
calculated is subtracted from the need standard to determine the amount of his AFDC check.
84. See, e.g., 533 F. Supp. at 937.
This argument is premised, inter alia, upon administrative regulations at 47 Fed. Reg. 5675
(1982) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 233.20 (a)(3)(ii)(D)) which mandate that, in determining
need, "[n]et income . . . and resources available for currnet use shall be considered .... 1
Specifically, plaintiffs therefore urge that when "need is determined" with the work expense disregard, the $75 deduction must be out of net income.
85. Id.
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that work expenses are deducted from net income, 81 and two holding
87
that such deductions come out of gross income.
C.

Workfare

1.

The Provisions

"Workfare" is a term popularly used to describe welfare programs
in which the recipient "works off" his wages in a job of the welfare
agency's choice. The idea is not new; it has for some years been a littleused part of the AFDC program known by the title "Community Work
and Training Programs."" Under this past law, however, states could
not force AFDC recipients to work off their benefit checks. No federal
statute permitted state sanctions against those who chose to refuse
workfare jobs.8 9
2.

The Amendment

The 1981 amendments give states the authority to force their
AFDC recipients to work off their AFDC benefits.9 For the first time,
states may deny or reduce benefit checks to those who refuse to accept
employment under workfare. 91 The Reagan administration advocated
making this workfare plan mandatory with all of the states but was
unsuccessful." The 1981 amendments which passed Congress made
workfare optional with the states." Again in 1982, the administration
tried and failed to impose mandatory workfare on the states."
Those states choosing to participate in workfare must implement
the-program in accordance with federal guidelines. States must, for ex-

86.

See 533 F. Supp. at 944; Turner v. Woods, No. C 81-4457 TEH, slip op. at 20 (N.D.

Cal. July 29, 1982).
87. See Dickenson v. Petit, 536 F. Supp. I100, 111I (D. Me. 1982); James v. O'Bannon,
No. C82-1588 (E.D. Pa. June 18, 1982).
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 609 (1976). For an analysis of this statute's history, see WORK AND
WELFARE, supra note 38, at 70-72.
89.

But see infra notes 90-91.

Moreover, the position of the Social Security Administration in the past has been that forcing
AFDC recipients to "work off" their benefits (with no other salary provided) was forbidden. See
United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Administration,
Action Transmittal No. SSA-AT-79-5 (OFA) (Feb. 15, 1979).
90. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2307, 95 Stat.
357, 846-48 (1981) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 609).
91. Id. at 848. ("[tlhe provisions of section 402(a)(19)(F) [which permit reductions in
AFDC benefits) shall apply to any individual referred to [workfare] who fails to participate in
such program ....
"). Id.
92. See Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Additional
Details on Budget Savings 141 (1981).
93. 47 Fed. Reg. 5683 (1982) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 238.01).
94. See Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Major
Themes and Additional Budget Details 50 (1982).
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ample, place recipients only in public service jobs"' that will not result
in the displacement of salaried employees." After recipients are placed
in workfare jobs, they may not be paid any compensation in addition to
their AFDC check.97 States may not accord workfare workers employee status 98 nor are they required to provide worker's compensation." States may require recipients to work a maximum monthly number of hours calculated by dividing the worker's family monthly AFDC
grant amount by the minimum wage. 100
3.

The Amendment's Consequences

a.

Background

As noted before, workfare is not a new idea in America's welfare
experience.10 1 Nor is the variant of workfare written into the 1981
95. 47 Fed. Reg. 5684 (1982) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 238.52(a)).
96. Id. (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 238.52(b)).
97. Id. (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 238.20(d)).
98. 47 Fed. Reg. 5659, response 3, 5684 (1982) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 238.20(d)).
99. 47 Fed. Reg. 5684 (1982) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 238.18). Compare these provisions with the former provisions at 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(l)(F) (1976).
100. 47 Fed. Reg. 5684 (1982) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 238.20(b)).
101. In fact, the idea dates back at least as far as the seventeenth century. See Comment,
CWEP: The Community Work Experience Program-California's Latest Effort "To Set the
Poor on Work," 9 U.S.F.L. REV. 139, 141 n.II (1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment, CWEP].
The concept was most elaborately developed, however, in early nineteenth-century England. The
England of Charles Dickens' day saw the "workhouse" as the prime solution to penury. Interestingly, the intellectual foundations for the workhouse were laid in the writings of the philosopher
Jeremy Bentham. Using his famous utilitarian calculus, he warned of the dangers of making welfare too attractive.
If the condition of persons maintained without property by the labour of others were rendered more [pleasant] than that of persons maintained by their own labour then, in proportion as the existence of this state of things were ascertained, individuals destitute of property would be continually withdrawing themselves from the class of persons maintained by
their own labour, to the class of persons maintained by the labour of others ....

Quoted in J. POYNTER,

SOCIETY AND PAUPERISM

125 (1969). Simply put, the lot of those on the

dole had to be made so miserable that few would forsake honest work for a life of public subsidy.
Bentham had a wealth of ideas as to how this might be accomplished. The poor might, for
instance, be forced to dress in distinctive and embarrassing ways so that their condition would be
obvious to all. Id. at 126. Or, the authorities could search all of the parishes of England to ferret
out the "idle" among the citizenry; the idle could then be "put under a kind of half-military
command, distributed into companies of fives-tens under Corporals, those under Sergeants, and so
on. . . . " M. MACK, JEREMY BENTHAM: AN ODYSSEY OF IDEAS 297 (1963). England took such
notions seriously and the workhouses established during that age were the inevitable result. In the
words of the government authorities charged with the implementation of such policies, the workhouse would be a place where "none will enter voluntarily; work, confinement, and discipline, will
deter the indolent and vicious; and nothing but extreme necessity will induce any to accept the

comfort which must be obtained ......

Quoted in F. PIVEN & R.

CLOWARD, REGULATING THE

POOR 33-34 (1971).
To this extent, the workhouses must certainly be judged successful. One contemporary wrote
that they were "[a]t their best . . . places where existence for the inmates was barely tolerable

...

. " Cited in G.

SLATER, POVERTY AND THE STATE

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol8/iss1/4

64 (1930). At their worst, such places

1982]

COMMENTS

AFDC amendments a new version of this old theme. In fact, the federal workfare provisions enacted in 1981102 are the same provisions-in
sections, word for word-as those advocated by Governor Reagan of
California in 1971.108 Reagan's workfare plan served the state of California until it was abandoned by the California legislature as a failure
a few short years after its enactment. 1° When elected President, Reagan brought his workfare plans and their architect01 a to Washington
with him; these were the plans that Congress enacted in nearly wholesale fashion in 1981. 1" It will be useful, then, to evaluate workfare
from the perspective of how it has worked in California and elsewhere
in the past. Such an analysis might foretell much about federal
workfare's future prospects. What follows is a r~sum6 of the arguments
that have been made in favor of workfare recently, evaluated in the
light of the record of past workfare programs.
b. Workfare will "provide experience and training for individuals not
otherwise able to obtain employment, in order to assist them to move
into regular employment."107
Under California's workfare, 689 persons participated during the
period June, 1972 to February, 1973.100 The United States Department

were frightful. The destitute were forced to live and work in conditions of bestial squalor. Families were torn apart; only petty, useless tasks were accomplished at a cost to the government which
vastly -exceeded supporting the poor with simple grants in their own homes. Id. at 64-67, 93-99;
POYNTER, supra at 14-17; A. YOUNG & E. ASHTON, BRITISH SOCIAL WORK IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 43-55 (1967). Perhaps most shocking was the fact that, in the final analysis, such cruelty did nothing to deter citizens' dependence "on the dole." POYNTER, supra at 16.
102. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2307, 95 Stat. 357,
846-48 (1981) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 609).
103. See Welfare Reform Act, ch. 578, § 25.3, 1971 Cal. Stat. 1155, 1155-58 (codified at
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11325-27), repealed by Act of June II, 1976, ch. 215, § 1, 1976
Cal. Stat. 400.
104. Id.
Several years after the statute was enacted in California, state officials began to report flaws
in the workfare system to the state legislature; it was on the basis of these reports and others that
the legislature finally decided to discontinue the program. See Hearings, supra note 34, at 215
(submission of Barbara Joe, National Association of Social Workers, Inc.). At the time the program was being dismantled in California, a report on its effectiveness concluded that workfare
"did not achieve any of its objectives." Quoted in N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1981, at A22, col. 6. An
analyst employed by the California legislature recounted that "the program never really did anything. It ended up like a leaf-raking operation." Id. at col. 4.
105. Robert Carleson is one of the chief architects of the workfare provisions discussed
herein. See Schorr, Paring the Rolls, Wall St. J.,June 4, 1981, at I, col. 6.
106. President Reagan was unsuccessful only to the extent that he urged that all of the
states be required to participate in workfare. See supra notes 92-94.
107. Language of the report which accompanied the 1981 amendments through Congress.
See S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 508-09, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 767, 775.
108. See Comment, CWEP, supra note 101, at 153 n.85.
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of Health, Education and Welfare, in studying this group of workfare
participants, found that only eighteen had moved into private sector
employment as a result of the "training" received through workfare.'"'
Perhaps the most embarrassing statistic to emerge from the California
experience with workfare was the revelation that the AFDC recipients
in the counties without workfare had higher success rates in finding
employment on their own than did the recipients in those counties
where workfare was mandated. 110 Also, a study of Massachusetts
workfare participants could trace little positive effect from the
workfare participation on these workers' future employability. 1 ' This is
hardly startling because useful training is virtually forbidden by the
workfare plans implemented at the federal level in 1981 and in California in 1971. Specifically, states may only offer employment in the form
of public, non-profit jobs. 112 Moreover, these workfare jobs may not replace normal positions that would be filled by salaried employees.'
Statutory language aside, workfare in practice often translates into
pushing recipients into jobs where they
quilt, 1 4 sweep streets," 5 and
7
act as janitors"' and meter-maids."
Moreover, workfare's effects on training and employment may not
be merely neutral. Providing cities and counties with legions of unpaid
workfare employees has also been observed to displace salaried employees. Two commentators have noted that past state experience with
workfare had shown that "there is a significant incentive for fiscally
strapped cities to replace higher paid public employees [with workfare
employees]." ' 18 Such fears have been expressed about current workfare
plans as well. 1 ' In conclusion, the consensus of welfare professionals,
after years of experience with workfare, is that the program either has

109. Id. at 153 n.85, 165.
110. See Hearings, supra note 34, at 215 (submitted by Barbara Joe, National Association
of Social Workers, Inc.).
111. See Schorr, supra note 105, at 22. In fact, it appears that Massachusetts workfare
participants remained on the rolls longer than non-workfare participants. See 127 CONG. REc.
S3298 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1981) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
112. 47 Fed. Reg. 5684 (1982) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 238.52(a)).
113. Id. (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 238.52(b)).
114. See Hearings, supra note 34, at 92 (statement of Angela Sosnowski, spokesman, National Anti-Hunger Coalition).
115. See 127 CONG. REc. S2231 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1981).
116. See The Heritage Foundation, Workfare: Breaking the Poverty Cycle 5 (1982).
117. Id. at 9.
118. See Zall & Betheil, supra note 40, at 277.
119. See Hearings, supra note 34, at 259, 266 (statements by Jordan Rossen, spokesman
for the UAW union, and Albert Russo, spokesman for the AFSCME union); 47 Fed. Reg. 565960 (1982); Bland, Workfare Won't Work, Foes Claim, Dayton Journal Herald, Sept. 17, 1982, at
24, col. I.
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no effect upon a recipient's future employment prospects, 20 or a negative effect. 121
c. I advocate a system that will encourage people to take work, and
that means whatever work is available ...
If a job puts bread on the table, if it gives you the satisfaction
of providing for your children and lets you look everyone else in
the eye, I don't think that it is menial. But it is just this attitude
that makes others, particularly low-income workers, feel somehow
that certain kinds of work are demeaning. Scrubbing floors, emptying bedpans

. . .

is not enjoyable work, but a lot of people do it.

And there is as much dignity in that as there is in any other work
to be done in this country, including my own.' 2 '
Some workfare advocates claim that workfare, even if a failure at
providing valuable job experience, still imparts to recipients a sense of
dignity at an honest job well done." 8 One cannot be certain how many
of these same advocates speak from the experience of work as a quilter,
a meter-maid, a janitor, or a street-sweeper." 4 On the other hand, one
can be certain that the sociological research on point does not support
their position. Research indicates that coercing welfare recipients into
demeaning employment induces frustration'" which might lessen a recipient's incentive to work.
A number of commentators have criticized the 1981 workfare provisions as especially exploitative in their lack of dignity and adequate
protection for workers." 6 The amendments, for example, forbid states
from according workfare participants status as employees."17 This regulation would deny workers benefits such as Social Security; other regulations permit the states at their discretion to deny worker's compen-

120. See THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE 1982 BUDGET
57 (J. Pechman ed. 1981).
121. See Joe, supra note 37, at 23; supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
122. President's Remarks at the Republican Governors Conference, PuB. PAPERS 551, 55455 (Apr. 19, 1971).
A popular notion is that the poverty-stricken, or those who have long been on welfare, have
developed a dislike for employment. This myth has been repeatedly disproven by the relevant
research. See Goodwin, Do the Poor Want to Work: A Social-Psychological Study of Work
Orientation, The Brookings Institution 32, 45-46 (1972). Cf N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1981, at A22,
col. 4.
123. See. e.g., 127 CONG. REC. S2231 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1981) (statement of Sen.
Proxmire).
124. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
125. Carter, The Employment Potential of AFDC Mothers: Some Questions and Some
Answers, WELFARE IN REV., July-Aug. 1968, at 340.
126. See 47 Fed. Reg. 5659-60 (1982).
127. 47 Fed. Reg. 5659, response 3, 5684 (1982) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 238.20(d)).
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sation to workfare participants as well. 2" Former regulations forbid
states from compelling the employment of mothers of children aged six
and under;'" the 1981 regulations permit states to impose workfare
upon mothers with children as young as three years of age.13 0 When
the 1981 AFDC proposals were first discussed, some social scientists
cautioned that states, given substantial authority in implementing
workfare, might adopt punitive measures.'" 1 Such fears were not unjustified, judging from the states' past implementation of workfare plans.
As one AFDC recipient recounted:
Recently a 60 year old woman who receives General Assistance was
called by the welfare department to do some filing for them. She was
ordered to come in there or lose her assistance payment, but she had to
absorb the cost of her transportation and other expenses. Since all she
gets as a result is the same G.A. benefit, reduced by her work-related
expenses, workfare has cost her money she can't afford, and she still has
yourself
[no] paid work experience to show some other employer. Place
132
labor.
slave
by
mean
we
what
see
you
and
in her position,
Some of the workfare rules recently adopted by the state of Arizona
appear to be of the type most feared by welfare professionals. Arizona's regulations assume "transportation is the responsibility of the
recipient."13 s It should be emphasized in this connection that an Arizona mother (with two children) who participates in workfare will be
earning a grand total of ninety-three dollars disposable income per
week-her AFDC check. 1 " This income represents sixty-three percent
of the United States poverty level.' 3 5
Dignity, then, is more the rhetoric than the reality of workfare.
Or, as one critic put it, "[t]hey plan to make life on welfare so miserable that even if it is financially beneficial for a [working] mother to go
on welfare, she'll hesitate . . .it's based on an adverse moral judgment
on the poor-'You're poor because you deserve to be poor'."' 1 6
d. Under workfare, "[t]he community receives something in exchange
for its assistance . . . . [Moreover, a] workfare program may reduce

128. 47 Fed. Reg. 5684 (1982) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 238.18).
129. 45 C.F.R. § 224.20(b)(8) (1980).
130. 47 Fed. Reg. 5683 (1982) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 238.14(b)(2)).
131. See Rein, supra note 46, at 225. See also Hearings, supra note 34, at 266.
132. See Hearings. supra note 34, at 92 (statement of Angela Sosnowski, spokesman, National Anti-Hunger Coalition).
133. See Martin-Leff, Survey of State WIN Demonstration Applications, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 42 (1982).
134. See Joe, supra note 37, at ap!p. A.
135. Id.
136. See Reagan's Polarized America, supra note 2, at 19.
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welfare costs by deterring some persons who should be self-supporting
from remaining on the dole." 1 '
As this last argument goes, even conceding that workfare may offer a recipient nothing at all in the way of either job training or basic
dignity, society still benefits. The society, that is, finally gets a return
on its AFDC investment because lazy AFDC malingerers are cut from
the public trough and put to work where they should be.1 38
This view of welfare is probably the most pervasive and heartfelt
opinion of Americans today. A 1969 poll showed a full eighty-four percent of the American public in agreement with the statement "[t]here
are too many people receiving welfare money who should be working." I8" Many of us have come to regard welfare recipients as
able-bodied males who could earn a living if they would only accept
available jobs, spend their money wisely, and abstain from drink and
loose living. Those who live off welfare, of course, never work, but manage still to live in style. They drive Cadillacs, eat steaks while luxuriating
in front of their color tv's, and winter in Florida. If the welfare check
becomes too skimpy to cover all their vices, they slink down to the local
welfare office and invent another needy aunt or procreate another illegitimate child, who, like themselves, will spend his or her life on welfare. "
Putting all of these "chiselers" to work has therefore become a popularly-held goal. This section will not address the more theoretical question of whether coercive work requirements should be a part of AFDC,
a program begun "[flor the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes .... 141 Instead, the public's expectations of the role workfare can play in helping society and cutting
the welfare rolls will be evaluated in the light of recipient census data
and past workfare experiences.
It will be useful to begin this analysis with some little-known and
oft-ignored government statistics 2 that reveal who is supported by
AFDC. These figures will give some rough indication of how many recipients can be forced to "work off" their benefits. The starting point
will be the number 10,358,000. It represents the total number of

See The Heritage Foundation, supra note 116, at 5.
See Executive Office of the President, supra note 92, at 141.
See Feagin, We Still Believe That God Helps Those Who Help Themselves, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Nov. 1972, at 101, 107.
140. H. RODGERS, JR., POVERTY AMID PLENTY 209 (1979).
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976).
142. Almost all of the statistics that follow are derived from 1979 Department of Health
and Human Services data: the most recent data available. Even this 1979 data is not yet available
in raw form; citations here will therefore come from Characteristics, supra note 23, a preview of
these 1979 statistics written by government analysts.
137.
138.
139.
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AFDC recipients in 1979.148 Of this grand total, how many could "earn

a living if they would only accept available jobs, spend their money
wisely, and abstain from drink and loose living"? "' To find what portion of these 10.4 million AFDC recipients are freeloaders, one will
have to subtract out all of the children on AFDC-fully seventy percent of this total.'" The remaining thirty percent are adult family
members living with needy children. Out of this remaining thirty percent, strikingly few fit the common image of the able-bodied male malingerer on welfare. Only two percent of all AFDC recipients are adult
males.' Of this concededly small number, very nearly one-half are
males presently working, awaiting recall, or actively seeking jobs.' 4 7 So
this leaves the other one-half of the two percent of adult males on
AFDC not interested in working. Many in this half uninterested in
work could not work if they wished to. An entire forty percent of this
half are so handicapped by illness and other incapacities that work is
impossible.' 48 When all of this subtracting is complete, one is left with
a group of less than thirty thousand theoretically employable adult
males-who comprise one-half of one percent of all AFDC recipients in
the nation.
Considering only this small assortment of able-bodied males, how
employable is this group in reality? Statistics reveal the average male
in the group to be a noncaucasian' 4 who did not graduate from high
school' 50 and whose only past work experience has been in a blue-collar
job.' 5' He lives downtown in a large city' 8 ' where jobless rates would
be the highest in the region where he lives. In other words, this is an
assortment of men who would not find it especially easy to attain
financial self-support, let alone support of a family. And, of course all
of these AFDC men have families. Other studies have implied that the
employability of adult females is similarly low.' 5 a

143. Characteristics, supra note 23, at 3.
144. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
145. Characteristics,supra note 23, at 3, 7. Of those children on AFDC, 89% are eligible
for aid because they do not have the support of a father. See id. at 7.
146. Id.at 6.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.at 5.
150. Id.at 6.
151. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL AND
REHABILITATION SERVICE, FINDINGS OF THE 1973 AFDC STUDY, PT. I 10 (1974).
152. Characteristics,supra note 23, at 5.
153. See generally WORK AND WELFARE, supra note 38, at 56-68; Carter, supra note 125,
at 340; Cox, The Employment of Mothers as a Means of Family Support, WELFARE IN REV.,
Nov.-Dec. 1970, at 9; Levinson, How Employable Are AFDC Women?, WELFARE IN REV., JulyAug. 1970, at 12.
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From these numbers, one arrives at the first truth of welfare,
American-style. Welfare is generally a program for children today.
There are some adults, but they are generally unable to work. Many of
these adults have several disabilities, any one of which would prevent
employment.'" Common sense alone would suggest that "[i]n reality,
if the recipient's situation and capacity had permitted independence he
would not be on assistance .... -I"
The second truth of American welfare is a corollary of the first.
Namely, one cannot expect workfare to effect any significant reform in
the welfare system. There are simply too few recipients who can be
forced to "work off" their benefits. Past workfare programs highlight
this problem. Then-Governor Reagan proposed in 1971 to enlist 58,000
recipients into his California workfare program:'" in practice, the program never served as many as 10,000.5 7 West Virginia, one of the first
states to implement workfare under the 1981 amendments, has to date
been able to place 1200 recipients in jobs; this represents less than two
percent of the state's total AFDC population.'" Past experiences in
Minnesota, New York, California, and Massachusetts have been similarly bleak;'" far fewer recipients than expected actually participate.
A number of economic circumstances also weigh against the program's success. Workfare is not cheap. Because recipients must work in
s
public-service positions that will not displace salaried employees,' "

Specifically, in 1979, three in five AFDC mothers who were not working were either incapacitated or caring for a child under the age of six. See Characteristics. supra note 23, at 6.
-Of course the employability of AFDC mothers depends in large degree upon the availability
of adequate child-care. And yet, social services like day-care centers have been some of the first
programs cut in the recent rounds of federal budget-cutting. See supra note 57. Even in past
years, lack of child-care facilities for AFDC mothers has been the "largest single barrier to their
seeking employment." See Solarz, supra note 45, at 19. See also WORK AND WELFARE, supra
note 38, at 56-58, 90. Future prospects may be only more bleak. Today, day-care facilities can
provide spaces for only one in six preschool-aged children of working mothers; in the next decade,
over 11 million women will be joining the work force. See Dayton Journal Herald, July 31, 1982,
at 16, col. 2.
154. See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
155. See KADUSHIN, supra note 21, at 197.
156. See Beilenson & Agran, The Welfare Reform Act of 1971, 3 PAc. L.J. 475, 492
(1972).
157. Did Reagan's "Workfare" Work in California?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 30,
1981, at 23; N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1981, at A22, col. 5.
158. West Virginia has 79,971 AFDC recipients. See AFDC: Recipients of Cash Payments
and Total Amount, by State, December, 1980, Soc. SECURITY BULL., Dec. 1981, at 52. As of
July 1982, 1200 of these had been assigned to workfare positions. See The Heritage Foundation,
supra note 116, at 9.
159. See Schiller, Welfare: Reforming Our Expectations, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1981, at
55, 63; Welfare "Reform'-1971 Style, 45 Soc. SERv. REV. 482, 485-87 (1971); N.Y. Times,
May 6, 1981, at A20, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1981, at El, col. 4.
160. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
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workfare employees make no tangible economic contribution to the
states where they work. At the same time, states must often expend
outrageous sums to provide these jobs. Supervisors must be hired to
watch these workers; offices need to be established over the far reaches
of the state to administer the program. Ohio's new workfare plans serve
as an example. In Ohio, it will cost thirty to fifty million dollars to
force welfare recipients to work for their benefits."' In the process, 875
new administrators will have to be added to Ohio's state and county
welfare offices. 1 ' New York City welfare officials have already made it
clear that workfare will be too expensive to use in that city.1"
Congress predicted federal budget savings from workfare to be
negligible."" Some critics claim that the government will actually lose
money in the endeavor.16 If experience is a guide, Reagan's California
workfare experiment demonstrated no cost savings for the California
state government.1"

e.

Workfare: an Epilogue

A particularly kind assessment of workfare's past record would admit that the program has shown no great success in helping to increase
workers' employability or dignity, nor in helping to decrease state costs.
A pessimist might sum up the states' past experiences with workfare as
"abysmal failures."'16 In any event, the states have given the new federal workfare provisions a cold reception. State welfare officials at the
1982 quarterly meeting of the American Public Welfare Association
went on record against mandatory workfare.'" As of this writing, less
than ten states are considering adopting the new federal workfare
plans.169

161. See Diemer, Bold Workfare Program Tests Reagan Philosophy, Clev. Plain Dealer,
June 20, 1982, at 26A, col. 1.See also Bland, supra note 119.
162. Id.
163. See Schorr, supra note 105, at 22.
164. No savings were estimated from workfare in fiscal year 1982; savings of $20 million
were expected in 1983. See S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., istSess. 509, reprinted in 1981 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 767, 776.
165. See Hearings, supra note 34, at 266.
166. See Comment, CWEP, supra note 101, at 152 n.84; Hearings, supra note 34, at 215,
222-23.
167. See Hearings, supra note 34, at 263.
168. Telephone interview with Richard Jensen, Senior Policy Analyst with the American
Public Welfare Association (Aug. 26, 1982).
169. Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and South Dakota.
See National Employment and Law Project, Update on Workfare Proposals in Federal Budget
and in States Implementing CWEP and WIN Demo Programs 6 (1982).
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IV.

CONCLUSION

As has been noted, a number of distressing policy implications
were written into the 1981 AFDC amendments. Workfare, the stuff of
which American campaign speeches have long been made, was finally
enacted at the federal level. Instead of putting lazy multitudes of recipients to honest work, however, workfare is just as likely to cost multitudes to exploit only a few recipients in only a few demeaning makework positions. Worse yet may be the long-term effects of Congress'
treatment of the earnings of the voluntarily employed AFDC recipient.
Because of the severe limits placed on the disregards of recipients'
earned income and work expenses, many recipients may choose to quit
work entirely. To the extent that the law awards a deserted mother
more money to support her children if she quits her job than if she
works, the law affords her but one real option.
Shifting the focus away from the "what" and toward the "how,"
these issues become at once more interesting and complex. How could
statutes with so little to recommend them wind through Congress?
How could such policy implications have been tolerated by the statutes'
draftsmen? Answers to these questions might reveal much about
America's treatment of the poor generally.
Quite simply, the presence of the poor in a society breeds bias and
unease even in the best of economic times. And in "hard times," the
poor are the most convenient of scapegoats. As a result, America today
lacks any rational or studied strategy to combat poverty. In place of
logic, Americans resort to rhetoric in dealing with the problems of the
poor. In a political context in which politicians find it useful to begrudge welfare recipients of their aid money, our poverty law comes to
reflect untrue and unfair assumptions about the poor. President Reagan
was recently questioned about the rising federal budget deficit for fiscal
1983. Being pressed for answers, the President responded with a story
he had heard about how a young man had used food stamps to
purchase a single orange-only to buy a bottle of vodka with the
change.1 70 With policy dialogue on this level, the nation obviously gets
what it deserves in the way of ill-conceived statutes.
This problem of welfare law bias was perhaps best discussed in an
article some years ago by Professor tenBroek.171 Professor tenBroek
traced America's thoughts about the poor back to their roots in medieval England. His article analyzed England's earliest welfare statutes,
medieval laws which assumed

170. See Reagan's Polarized America, supra note 2, at 17.
171. tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257 (1964).
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[ildleness . . . to be a result of personal choice rather than economic
conditions. Based on personal fault it was personally correctable if only
the will were instilled. Accordingly the Tudors, like their predecessors,
unleashed the furies of the criminal law against combined idleness and
poverty. 'Ruffelers, sturdy vagabonds, and valiant beggars' were to be
seized, tied naked to the end of a cart and whipped through the nearest
market town until bloody, and then returned to the place where they
were born or last dwelt, each there to 'put hymselfe to laboure lyke as a
trewe man oweth to do.' That no work was to be found in that place did
not matter. If 'loitering, wandering, and idleness or vagabondage' continued, the punishment was repeated, successively augmented by having the
upper gristle of the right ear 'clean cut away' and eventually by death."'
Upon such assumptions about the poor, English welfare law was being
enacted as early as the fourteenth century. Even today, these ancient
statutes have a strangely familiar tone.
Under severe penal sanctions, men and women 'able in body and within
the age of three score years' were required to work for anybody who
wanted them. They had to work, not at wages determined by individual
or collective bargaining. . . but at wages frozen at those 'accustomed' in
[even more ancient times] . .. 173
The author points to American welfare laws like AFDC as the direct
descendants of such English precedents. His major thesis is that English and American poverty law has always served two functions: first,
to stigmatize and exploit the poor, and only secondly to maintain the
poor at a bare subsistence.1 4 Assuming that these functions are an accurate reflection of medieval law, it is our responsibility to ensure that
they do not continue to be reflected in our own law.
The nation's poor can ill afford much more in the way of ill-conceived policy.'"5
Michael Neuhardt

172. Id. at 277.
173. Id. at 271.
174. Id. at 286, 297-98.
175. One year after the 1981 amendments' enactment, impacts upon the nation's poor are
being clearly felt. See supra note 64. One can get another clue of this by comparing AFDC
recipients' incomes to the poverty level, a government-set figure which theoretically represents a
subsistence existence for a family; in reality the poverty level is well below subsistence. In any
event, the amount of income the states furnish to the needy in the form of AFDC and food stamps
does not enable the average welfare family to receive the poverty level in any state but Alaska. In
fact, over half of the states do not even furnish aid per family that equals even seventy-five percent
of the poverty level. See Joe, supra note 37, at 4; Hearings, supra note 34, at 45.
In the wave of 1981 budget cuts, there were few dissenting voices in Congress. One Congressman did make his opinion clear, however.
I want to help the President cut spending and balance the budget. I want to help the
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President achieve tax equity in this country. But I have no stomach for achieving this by
...cutting assistance to 700,000 AFDC families and by cutting assistance to over 1.3
million children in the poorest families in this country. The first part of the President's
program which we will consider today, raising revenues by cutting services to our poor, our
aged, and our disabled, is a bad way, I believe, to put our country on the road to economic
recovery. Later this year the full committee is going to be asked to distribute these hardearned revenues to America's wealthy. I can't really help but wonder this morning if that is
what the President and the American people really intend." See Hearings, supra note 34,
at 3 (statement of Cong. Stark).
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